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I. INTRODUCTION

The holding in Farley v. Sartin' that there is a claim for the wrongful death
of an unborn child2 regardless of viability provokes broad discussion, on both legal
and public policy grounds. Understanding the basis for the court's decision is
important to practicing attorneys faced with prosecuting or defending such claims,
however, more important are the issues created but left unresolved in the Farley
opinion. This Article will examine some of these issues, including the application
of West Virginia's comparative fault scheme, the admissibility of evidence of
whether the unborn child would have survived to a healthy birth and the appropriate
. Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, West Virginia; B.S., Business Administration, University of
Dayton, 1980; J.D., University of Dayton School of Law, cum laude, 1983.
466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
2 Like the court in Farley,this Article

vill
use the term "unborn child" instead of fetus. Id. at 523 n.3.
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measure of damages.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff's pregnant wife and unborn child were killed in a vehicular
accident with the defendant's tractor trailer.3 Although the unborn child was
between eighteen and twenty two weeks and "was neither large enough nor
developed enough to survive outside the womb," Mrs. Farley's obstetrician testified
that if she had not been killed, he had no reason to believe she would not have had
a normal pregnancy.'
The plaintiff brought suit for the wrongful death of his wife and unborn
child. Since the unborn child was not viable at the time of death, the circuit court
granted summary judgment.6 Reversing on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held:
In light of our previous interpretation of W.Va. Code, 55-7-5, and
the goals and purposes of wrongful death statutes generally, the
term "person," as used in W.Va. Code, 55-7-5 (1931) and the
equivalent language in its counterpart, W.Va. Code, 55-7-6 (1992),
encompasses a nonviable unborn child and, thus, permits a cause
of action for the tortious death of such child.'
In West Virginia, therefore, a wrongful death action may be brought for the
death of an unborn child, regardless of viability at the time of the death. This
decision, without legislative direction, is unique to West Virginia. "[O]f those
jurisdictions that have considered whether their wrongful death statutes ... permit

recovery for the death of a nonviable fetus, all but a few have refused to recognize
such a cause of action."' Only six states have allowed recovery for the wrongful

3 Id. at 523.

Id. at 523. In Roe v. Wade, the court stated that viability is usually placed at 28 weeks but may occur
as early as 24 weeks. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
'

' Farley,466 S.E.2d at 524.
6

Id.

7 Id. at 522.

' Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted) (citing cases from New
Mexico, Massachusetts, Maryland, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Washington, District of Columbia, Rhode
Island, Kansas, Hawaii, Michigan, New Hampshire, Alaska, South Carolina, Ohio and Oklahoma);

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/6

2

Hurney: A Practical View of Farley v. Sartin

1996]

PRACTICAL VIEW OF FARLEY V. SARTIN

death of a nonviable fetus; West Virginia is the only state to do so without express
legislative direction. 9
III. THE WEST VIRGINIA WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
An understanding of Farley and how to deal with it must start with the
actual language of the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Chapter 55, article 7,
section 5 of the West Virginia Code states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would
(if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every
such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.1"
The personal representative of the estate is the proper party plaintiff in a
wrongful death action." Chapter 55, article 7, section 6(b) of the West Virginia
Code discusses damages, and particularly directs to whom they are to be distributed:
In every such action for wrongful death the jury, or in a case tried
without a jury, the court, may award such damages as to it may
seem fair and just, and, may direct in what proportions the
damages shall be distributedto the surviving spouse and children,
including adopted children and stepchildren, brothers, sisters,
parents and any persons who were financially dependent upon the
decedent at the time of his or her death or would otherwise be
equitably entitled to share in such distribution after making
provision for those expenditures, if any, specified in subdivision

see also Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL MED.
99, 105 (1992) (stating that the majority ofjurisdictions require that the fetus be viable to constitute
a "person" under wrongful death statutes)[hereinafter Meadows].
9 Santana, 95 F.3d at 784.
'0 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994).
1 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(a) (1994); see Richardson v. Kennedy, 475 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1996)
(stating that the real party in interest is personal representative but the damages are awarded directly
to the beneficiaries).
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(2), subsection (c) of this section.' 2
The elements of damages that may be awarded are set forth in Chapter 55,
article 7, section 6(c)(1) of the West Virginia Code as follows:
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to,
damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace
which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance,
kindly offices and advice of the decedent; (B) compensation for
reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent, and (ii)
services, protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent;
(C) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitalization of the
decedent incident to the injury resulting in death; and (D)
reasonable funeral expenses. 3
IV. THE FARLEY COURT'S REASONING

To support its ultimate holding that a fetus is a "person" under the Wrongful
Death Act, the Farley court analyzed the purpose of such acts, the availability of an
action for injuries to a fetus later born alive, and prior decisions allowing wrongful
death actions for viable unborn children.
The opinion discusses at length the origins of wrongful death acts which
were enacted in response to the common law's refusal to allow compensation for
death. The statutes accomplish two major policies. They compensate the surviving
widows and children who were otherwise denied recovery, 4 and "rectifty] the

12

W. VA. CoD § 55-7-6(b) (1994) (emphasis added). If there are no survivors, the damages arc

distributed under Chapter 42, article 1, section I of the West Virginia Code. Id.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(1) (1994). Chapter 55, article 7, section 6(c)(2) of the West Virginia
Code further provides:
"3

In its verdict the jury shall set forth separately the amount of damages, if any,
awarded by it for reasonable funeral, hospital, medical and said other expenses
incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant or
defendants which resulted in death, and any such amount recovered for such ex
penses shall be so expended by the personal representative.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(2) (1994).
"[T]he English Parliament passed the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, commonly referred to as Lord
Campbell's Act.. . [which] permitted recovery of damages by the close relatives of a victim who was
tortiously killed ....Thus, by creating a cause of action for wrongful death, the English Parliament
rectified the disparity between a tortfeasor's liability for injuries and for the more egregious harm,
death." Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995) (citations omitted).
"
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disparity between a tortfeasor's liability for injuries and for the more egregious
harm, death."' 5 These policies provided the basis for the Farley court's
interpretation of "person."
Despite the recognition that at common law there was no claim for wrongful
death, 16 or for prenatal torts,7 the Farley court concluded that an unborn child is a
"person" under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act, regardless of its viability.
To reach this conclusion, the court tracked, at some length, the development of the
law of prenatal torts. Since Bonbrest v. Kotz, 8 the leading case allowing a child
born alive to recover for prenatal torts, the court found "every jurisdiction permits
recovery for prenatal injuries if a child is born alive. In addition, it generally does
not matter whether the injury occurred prior to or after the point of viability."' 19
Allowing injury claims regardless of viability was important to the Farley court
because it was concerned with allowing meritorious claims and not allowing a
tortfeasor to escape liability because of timing.
Where tortious injury caused the wrongful death of an unborn child, the
Farley court observed that the majority of jurisdictions permit a wrongful death
action if the unborn child had reached the point of viability.2" Since a viable unborn
child would have a cause of action for injury if born alive, the Farley court
concluded "it only is logical that the phrase 'person' within the context of a
wrongful death statute should include a viable unborn child who would have been
born alive but for the tortious injury inflicted causing death prior to birth."'
Otherwise, the court concluded, to allow recovery for a child born with injuries, but
deny it to a child who died, gives a tortfeasor "immunity from liability for causing
a greater harm."
,'Id.
'6Id. (citing Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co., 465 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1995); Swope v.
Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 89 S.E. 284,286 (1916)).
,7 Id. at 526 (citing Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967)).
"X65 F .Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Prior cases refused recovery because the infant was part of the
mother and the injury too remote. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884),
overruledby Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
,9Farley,466 S.E.2d at 528 (citations omitted).
0 Id.at 528-29 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
22 Id. at530.
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Discussing West Virginia precedent, the court explained that in Baldwin v.
Butcher,' it allowed an action for the death of a viable unborn child. Using twins
as an example, the court in Baldwin found it would be unjust and illogical to allow
recovery for one twin who died shortly after birth but deny it for the stillborn twin.24
The Baldwin court focused on the injustice of holding an injury-causing tortfeasor
liable while creating immunity for one causing the greater harm.'
From this analysis the court stated that it agreed with other courts, holding
that where a child is born alive, recovery is allowed for prenatal torts regardless of
when they occurred (before or after viability). Since the requirement of viability at
the time of injury is a "mere theoretical abstraction,"26 despite a lack of precedent,
the Farley court concluded "we can find no legitimate reason or persuasive reason
to infuse the [viability] distinction into West Virginia's [wrongful death] statute."27
The court explained:
In our judgment, justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to
walk away with impunity because of the happenstance that the
unborn child had not yet reached viability at the time of death. The
societal and parental loss is egregious regardless of the state of fetal
development.
Our concern reflects the fundamental value
determination of our society that life - old, young, and
prospective - should not be wrongfully taken away. In the
absence of legislative direction, the overriding importance of the
interest that we have identified merits judicial recognition and
protection by imposing the most liberal means of recovery that our
law permits.
Wrongful death statutes, after all, are designed to provide economic
compensation to the surviving family. When a family loses a
potential member because of tortious conduct, it suffers an injury
of the same order.., as that which occurs when it loses an existing
member. The statute allows recovery for the loss of a life that
would have provided love and sustenance but for the intervening

'

184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).

24

Farley,466 S.E.2d at 532.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 531.

27

Id. at 533.
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tort

.2

This ultimate holding followed the twin policies of compensating the
survivors and not allowing tortfeasors off the hook because the unborn child was
not viable.
V. DEALING WITH THE FARLEY v SARTIN CAUSE OF ACTION
The Farley action for the loss of an unborn child raises several questions

which must be developed in future litigation.
On the liability issue, the court did not address the effect of negligence by
the parents and how it fits into the application of West Virginia's law of comparative
fault. On the issue of causation, the court's opinion does not address whether the
defense can put on evidence that the unborn child would not have survived
regardless of the accident, or whether the child would have been healthy. Finally,
while the court's opinion presumes a recovery for the damages enumerated in the
wrongful death statute, there are significant evidentiary questions with respect to the
recovery of lost wages for the unborn child, and the danger of double recovery with
respect to damages awarded to the parents.
A.

Viability

Baby Farley was not viable. Based upon the only medical evidence in the
record, "Baby Farley was neither large enough nor developed enough to survive
outside the womb." 29 Because viability is not a prerequisite to a wrongful death
action, the court commented "our holding in this case eliminates the need for trial
courts to decide what often could be an extremely difficult factual question, i.e.,

28 Id. at 533-34 (citation omitted).
29

Farley,466 S.E.2d at 524. The court stated:

The deposition of Mrs. Farley's treating obstetrician, Dr. Gary Gilbert, which was
the only medical testimony in the record, adduced the following. Mrs. Farley was
probably eighteen weeks and a few days pregnant when calculated from the date
of the first day of her last menses, although she could have been as far along as
twenty-two weeks pregnant. Baby Farley was neither large enough nor developed
enough to survive outside the womb. "The earliest surviving infant that [the doctor
knew] of was right at 500 grams, which would have been about 22 weeks." Dr.
Gilbert concluded that if Mrs. Farley had not been killed in the accident, he had
"no reason to believe that she would not have a normal pregnancy."
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original). In the circuit court, plaintiffis counsel argued that
viability was a disputed issue of fact precluding summary judgment. In light of the decision on
viability, the court did not have to address this issue.
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whether the fetus was 'viable.""'3 However, the holding by the court and its
underlying policy - "the societal and parental loss is egregious regardless of the
state of fetal development"'f - should not be read to direct that viability is not an
issue in wrongful death cases. This reading of Farley is too broad, given the legal
issue addressed by the court and the remand to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
Chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code imposes three
prerequisites for recovery: (1) the death of a "person" (2) entitled to a cause of
action for damages if death had not resulted (3) caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default.3 2 While under Farley, an unborn child is a "person" under the Wrongful
Death Act, the issue of viability is still relevant to the issues of causation and
damages in these cases. The court recognized this, stating:
We recognize that the closer one gets to the moment of conception, the
more substantial becomes the potential for fraudulent claims and for
increased difficulties in resolving some issues of causation and damages.
However, those risks are no more of a justification to erect a bar to
legitimate claims in this context than they were when we dismissed them as
a reason for rejecting claims relating to viable unborn children in Baldwin."
Whether the fetus would have proceeded to a normal healthy birth is
certainly relevant to the issue of causation and damages. "Relevant evidence means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

30

Id. at 534.

31 Id. at
32

533.

Id. at 530.

33 Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534. The court stated, "The denial of valid claims in order to discourage

fraudulent ones and to avoid difficult problems in determining causation and fixing damages is not
only totally illogical, but also disregards the very essence of the judicial process." Id. at 529-30 (citing
Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 S.E.2d 633, 638 (La. 1981)). Indeed, the court echoed a similar sentiment in
overruling the long-held prohibition against recover of damages for emotional distress caused by
negligence in Heldreth v. Marrs, stating, "[r]eliable medical evidence is available to weed out the
fraudulent and trivial claims about which the Monteleone court was obviously concerned." 425 S.E.2d
157, 161 (W. Va. 1992); see also Riccottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va.
1993) (stating that plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress upon showing
of facts sufficient to guarantee that the emotional damage claim is "not spurious"); Courtney v.
Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993).
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it would be without the evidence. 34 Under Rule 401 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, evidence having any probative value whatsoever can satisfy the relevancy
definition, a liberal standard favoring a broad policy of admissibility.3 5 The offered
evidence does not have to make the existence of a fact to be proved more probable
than not to provide a sufficient basis for sending the matter to the jury.36 Although
materiality is not specifically defined in the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, "the
concept of materiality is embodied in Rule 401 insofar as relevancy is defined as a
relationship between certain evidence and a 'fact of consequence to the
determination of the action."' 3 7 All relevant evidence is admissible under Rules 401
and 402.38

Farley's holding should not be read to preclude the introduction of
evidence that the unborn child would not have survived, or would have been
disabled, to counter claims for future damages under the statue, most directly the
loss of reasonably expected income.39 The materiality and relevance of this
evidence becomes clear when compared to the estate's claim for loss of society and
future income. These damage claims necessarily require a finding that the child not
only would have been born, but would have proceeded to graduate from college
(like his or her parents) and would have had a normal life span but for the
negligently caused death.
That this task may involve complex medical or scientific issues is of no
4
consequence. In a series of decisions before and after Farley, Wilt v. Buracker, '

14

W.VA. R. EVID. 401.

3 Id.
31,McDougal v. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788 (W.Va. 1995).
W. VA. R. EVID. 402; FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA
LAWYERS § 4-1(C) (3d ed. 1994).
37

31 Id. (citing Jarvis v. Modem Woodmen of America, 406 S.E.2d 736, 741 n.4 (W. Va. 1991)).
31 Claims for lost future income of unborn children are based solely upon assumptions based upon
statistical information. See STANLEY S. SCHWARTZ & NORMAN D. TUCKER, HANDLING BIRTH
TRAUMA CASES 96 (1985). "In birth trauma cases, the task [of proving wage loss] is more difficult

since the injury occurs before the child has had any opportunity to demonstrate his earning potential."
Id; see also MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC AND HEDONIC DAMAGES 129
(1990) [hereinafter BROOKSHIRE & SMITH]. As explored later in this article, the significant evidentiary
barrier to this damages claim is the speculative nature of projecting earnings.
40 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).
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Gentry v- Magnum4 and Craddockv. Watson, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia directed trial judges that they must actively consider scientific
testimony pursuant to Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Indeed,
Gentry was decided only five days before Farley! Trial judges must analyze the
admissibility of challenged medical or scientific testimony to determine whether it
is (1) based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology,
(2) whether it is relevant and (3) whether it is reliable. The issues of reliability
must be resolved by consideration of the underlying methodology of the testimony,
including an assessment of whether the theory and its conclusion can be and have
been tested, whether the theory has been subjected to peer review, whether the
actual or potential rate of error is known and whether the theory is generally
accepted 3 In adopting the approach fostered by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,' the court directed trial judges to roll up their sleeves in situations
where the scientific theory at issue cannot be judicially noticed and hold a hearing
to determine its admissibility.45
Complex medical issues are litigated in courtrooms all over the country,
including West Virginia. The fact that they involve an unborn child makes no
difference to the legal framework in which they are presented and considered.
Several cases related to care of unborn children have reached the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. In James G. v. Caserta, the Supreme Court of West
Virginia answered certified questions about claims for wrongful pregnancy,
wrongful life and wrongful birth.46 Wrongful pregnancy applies to cases where a
failed sterilization procedure results in the birth of a healthy child. Wrongful birth,
as used by the court, applies to cases where the child is born with a birth defect. In
wrongful pregnancy cases, the court held that the parents may recover any medical
and hospital expenses resulting from the negligence, including costs of the
unsuccessful sterilization, pre-natal and post-natal care, childbirth and a second
sterilization, physical and mental pain suffered by the wife as a result of the
pregnancy and two sterilization surgeries and loss of consortium and loss of wages.
"The ordinary cost of raising a healthy child cannot be recovered in a wrongful

41

466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).

42

475 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 1996).

43

Wilt, 443 S.E.2d at 203.

44

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

41

See also Mayhom v. Logan Medical Found., 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).

46

332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
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pregnancy action." ' 7
The court rejected the claim for "wrongful life" brought by the child bom
with birth defects. However, the court recognized a cause of action for wrongful
birth, holding that parents may recover "the extraordinary costs for rearing a child
with birth defects not only during his minority, but also after the child reaches the
age of majority if the child is unable to support himself because of physical or
emotional disabilities." 8 James G. v. Caserta is significant in analyzing the Farley
decision because the court recognized the need for the parents to demonstrate the
existence of a genetic condition, discoverable by the physician, which should have
been disclosed in genetic counseling. Moreover, the plaintiffs damage claim
includes proof of the cost of extraordinary child care arising from the defects.
Obviously, thejury's consideration of these factors requires examination of complex
medical and genetic evidence.
Rine v. Irisar"9 involved the claim that the plaintiffs infant son suffered
profound mental retardation and cerebral palsy, among other things, as a result of
the defendant's failure to monitor the fetus with an electronic fetal monitor during
labor and failed to transfer her to a high risk facility for labor and delivery." In
Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center,5 the plaintiffs theory was that the
infants' brain damage "was caused by a lack of oxygen to his brain during the
lengthy labor and the forceps delivery performed negligently by [the defendant
'
physician]."52
The defense to this allegation was that the infant had certain
congenital defects which caused the brain damage. These are but two examples of
complex cases involving infants that make the point that we expect judges and juries
to deal with complex medical issues and they do, all the time.53
The medical issue related to causation and damages in "Farley" cases is
whether the unborn child would advance to a healthy birth. While this Article is not

47 Id. at 873.
48

Id.

49 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).

'0 Id. at 543.
s, 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1992); see also Garner v. Howe, No. 95-2492 1997 WL 9764 (4th Cir. Jan.
13, 1997) (discussing evidence in a birth trauma case).
52 Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 881.

" "The court must decide the dispute that is before it. It cannot refuse because the job is hard, or
dubious, or dangerous." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY

(1960).
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intended to be a treatise on fetal medicine, the medical literature abounds with
scientific and statistical information about causes of and preventative measures for
birth defects. Not all pregnancies advance to birth, and complications can result in
terminatkin of the pregnancy or the birth of a premature, and perhaps brain damaged
infant. Studies have shown significantly high losses of pregnancy in couples who
conceive, but where the pregnancy ends before it becomes clinically apparent.54 A
significant study in West Virginia hypothesized that "systematically identifying
infants at high risk of postneonatal mortality and ensuring that these infants received
adequate health care would reduce mortality."' 55 The authors concluded that
"[e]nsuring affordable, available, accessible, and acceptable care for a small group
of at-risk infants was associated with a dramatic drop in overall postneonatal
mortality in West Virginia. ,,16 By analyzing selected variables such as race, age,
marital status and social class, researchers have come to conclusions about the health
status of various populations and the consequent ability to produce healthy babies. 7
For example, "[f]or women who bear children at an early or late age, both the
'
mother and her infant may be at risk for pregnancies with poor outcomes. 58
Adolescents have a greater risk for problem pregnancies, a proportion of which is
most likely secondary to other conditions such as poor prenatal care or lack of

Allen J. Wilcox et al., Incidence of Early Loss of Pregnancy,319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 189 (1988).
The authors studied the risk of early loss of pregnancy and concluded "[t]he total rate of pregnancy
loss after implantation, including clinically recognized spontaneous abortions, was 31 percent." Id.
(quoting from abstract). See also A. Brian Little, There's Many a Slip 'Twixt Implantation and the
Crib, 319 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 241 (1988) ("Thus, when the loss of fertilized eggs before implantation
is included, about 52 percent of all pregnancies end before the 28th week, and all but 6 percent of this
52 percent occurs before and abortion is recognized clinically.").
34

David Z. Myerberg et al., Reducing Postneonatal Mortality in West Virginia: A Statewide
Intervention ProgramTargetingRisk Identified at and After Birth, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 631 (1995).
53

56 Id.
57 Calvin J. Hobel, FactorsBefore Pregnancy That Influence Brain Development, in PRENATAL AND

PERINATAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH BRAIN DISORDERS

178 (Freeman ed. 1985) [hereinafter

Hobel]; see also National Centerfor Biotechnology Information Website (last modified Mar. 13, 1997)
<http:// www3.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/Omim> (cataloging human genes and genetic disorders); Prenatal
Screening Program, British Columbia Children's Hospital, Maternal Serum Markers of Fetal
Abnormalities:Progressin PrenatalScreening (visited Mar. 22, 1997) <htp://www.medscape.com
/Medscape/womens.health/1996/v01.n07/w100.lockitch/w1OO.lockitch.html>
("Second-trimester
screening of a pregnant woman's serum for markers of such congenital abnormalities as fetal trisomy
21 (Down syndrome) and neural tube defects has become an important part of antenatal care.").
5 Hobel, supra note 57, at 179.
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education. 9 The risk of poor fetal outcome begins to increase in mothers older than
age 30 years.' "Chronic hypertension and preeclampsia are common complications
in pregnancy of women older than 35 years. Because low birth weight and
dysmaturity are common findings, abnormal utero placental blood flow is thought
to be common in older mothers.' Still other studies examine "very limited data on
the effect of pre-pregnancy or early pregnancy exposure to hazardous substances on
fetal outcome."'62 A woman's reproductive history, including previous low birth
weight infants, prior spontaneous abortions, still birth or live born infants with
multiple or congenital abnormalities, prior therapeutic abortions and family diseases
are all factors.' Some studies focus on paternal characteristics.' The risk of having
a baby with Down's syndrome increases from 1 in 2000 in the population under age
30 to I in 356 in the population over age 35, decreasing to 1 in 12 at age 49.65 The
risk of having a neural tube defect is 5% where the first child has the problem, and
10% if two are born with the problem. 6 Genetic counseling has grown as science
develops ways to predict genetic disease. People with a higher risk of having a
genetically defective child "require genetic counseling to guide them through the
necessary learning and decision-making process involved in choosing whether to
have a child." 67
Certainly, the science and medicine are complex, but the court has already
recognized the admissibility of complex genetic and statistical evidence in the

'9 Id. at 180.

(aId.
Id. at 181; see also Medical Complications in Pregnancy (visited Mar. 22, 1997)
<http://www.obgyn.netenglish/ob/complica.htm> (providing various links to complications of
pregnancy); Definition of Preeclampsia(visited Mar. 22, 1997) < http://www.obgyn.netlenglish/ob/
preeclampsia definitions.htm>.
6j

62 Hobel, supra note 57, at 183.
63 Id. at 186-88.
61 Id. at 189-90.
65 STANLEY S. SCHWARTZ & NORMAN D. TUCKER, HANDLING BIRTH TRAUMA CASES (1985) (citing
RIVLIN ET AL., MANUAL OF CLINICAL PROBLEMS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (1982)).

66 Hobel, supra note 57 at 189-90; see <http:/www.cdc.gov/nceh/programs/infants/brthdfctprevent
/bdlinks.htm> (providing links to March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, Spina Bifida
Association, Alliance of Genetic Support Groups, New York Online Access to Health).
6'7

Hobel, supranote 57, at 189-90.
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criminal context. In State v. Woodall,68 decided before the adoption of the Daubert
approach to the evaluation of scientific evidence, the court stated:
Although we recognize the dangers inherent in evidence of
probabilities, we do not find them in this case. Blood type and
enzyme tests have general scientific acceptance, and the
distribution of particular blood traits in the population is
ascertainable. The party seeking to impeach blood test evidence is
free to cross-examine the proponent's experts and offer experts of
his own to discredit the conduct of the tests and the underlying
statistical probabilities.69
If complex evidence passes muster under the Wilt/Gentry approach, it
should be admissible in Farley cases, particularly in response to claims for damages
of loss of society and lost income.7"
B.

Comparative Negligence and the Unborn Child

In 1978, West Virginia judicially adopted a modified comparative
negligence scheme under which a party is barred from recovery if its negligence
equals or exceeds fifty percent of the combined negligence or fault of all parties to
an accident. "' While assumption of the risk is a separate defense in the West
Virginia scheme of comparative negligence, the jury must consider it in its overall
evaluation of the plaintiff's fault.72 Recovery is not barred by assumption of risk

68

385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).

Id. at 261 (citations omitted). Anyone who watched the marathon O.J. Simpson trial is familiar
with the mind numbing and complicated nature of DNA analysis. For an excellent collection of O.J.
Simpson trial information, see Court TV Website, (visited Mar. 22, 1997) <http://www.courttv.com/
casefiles/simpson/criminal/summary>.
69

70 Of course, whether this line of defense is tactically the way to go is another issue. Just because you
can raise these defenses doesn't mean you always should.
" Haba v. Big Arm Bar & Grill, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 915 (W. Va. 1996); Anderson v. Moulder, 394

S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1990); King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989); Valloric v. Dravo
Corp., 357 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1987); Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va- 1979).
72

King, 387 S.E.2d at 511.

The court explained that contributory negligence is carelessness or the

failure to use due care, but that assumption of the risk assumption of the risk imposes a higher
standard, applying only where the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the defect or dangerous condition,
fully appreciates the risk involved and continues to use the product or participate in the activity.
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unless the plaintiff's degree of fault - negligence and assumption of the risk equals or exceeds the combined fault or negligence of the other parties to the
accident.73 To obtain a proper assessment of the total amount of the party's
comparative fault it must be ascertained in relation to all the parties who contributed
to the accident, and not merely those defendants involved in the litigation.74 West
Virginia's adoption of modified comparative negligence did not change its
adherence to joint and several liability.75 Thus, a plaintiff may elect to sue any or
all of those responsible for his injuries and collect damages from whomever is able
to pay, regardless of their percentage of fault.76
The law of comparative fault poses difficult issues in a claim for the loss of
an unborn child. There is a conclusive presumption that a child under the age of
seven is incapable of negligence,77 thus the unborn child cannot be directly assigned
fault. The difficult issue is how to factor in fault by the parents directly relating to
the injury, such as negligence by the mother or father in the operation of an
automobile.
In Miller v. Warren,78 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held

Assumption of the risk, similar to comparative negligence, must be raised by a defendant in the answer
as affimative defenses. Id.; see also Desco Corp. v. Harry W. Trushel Constr., 413 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va.
1991); Bills v. Life Style Homes, Inc., 429 S.E.2d 80 (W. Va. 1993).
' Blake v. Wendy's International, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 414 (W. Va. 1991).
See Cline v. White, 393 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va. 1990). A party may be absent from the litigation
because it is beyond the court's jurisdiction, or has the benefit of some immunity, such as
governmental or Workers' Compensation immunity. Bowman, 282 S.E.2d at 613; see Miller v.
Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1991); Haba,468 S.E.2d at 915; see also W. VA.
CODE §§ 29-12A-I to -18 (1992) (governmental immunity); W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-6 to -6a (1994)
(workers' compensation immunity). Parties entering into good faith settlements are also protected
from suit. Smith v. Monongahela Power Co., 429 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1993); Cline, 393 S.E.2d at 923;
14

W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9(c) (1986) (MPLA).

I Kodym v. Frazier, 412 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1991); Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d
689 (W. Va. 1991).
Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 728 (W.Va. 1994); Kodym v. Frazier, 412 S.E.2d 219 (W.
Va. 1991). Exceptions to this principle are carved out in medical professional liability cases and
actions against municipalities. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(c-f) (1992).

7'

Miller v. Warren, 390 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1990). For children between the ages of seven and
fourteen, the presumption is rebuttable and a child age fourteen or older is presumed to be capable of
being negligent. Pino v. Szuch, 408 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1991); Godfrey v. Godfrey, 456 S.E.2d 488
(W. Va. 1995); Belcher v. CAMC, 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
71

7'

390 S.E.2d 207 (1990).
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"[t]he negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to the infant child, too young to
know how to take care of itself; nor can such child be guilty of contributory
negligence."79 Miller involved injuries sustained by two parents and their child in
a motel fire. Liability was contested, with experts for both sides disagreeing who
started the fire.8" On appeal, the plaintiff challenged several jury instructions which
allowed the jury to consider the plaintiffs combined negligence, effectively
imputing the negligence of the parents to the minor child. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held this was error:
The negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to the infant child,
too young to know how to take care of itself; nor can such child be
guilty of contributory negligence. Any duty the defendants had to
the plaintiffs ran to the infant personally, as well as to each of the
adults individually. An adult's negligence may be "imputed" to a
child only where the child's cause of action is derivative only, for
example, in a survivor's wrongful death action where the child was
not personally involved in the events giving rise to the cause of
action.81
As this passage suggests, Miller applies to injury cases. In cases for the
wrongful death of a child, the jury considers the negligence of the parents. Cole v.
Fairchild2 arose from the death of a minor. Stephen Cole, II, was killed in a
motorcycle accident on property owned by defendant Flat Top Lake Association.
The plaintiffs argued that Flat Top was liable for Stephen's death because he was
a business invitee when motorcycle riding on the property. When Flat Top
attempted to implead the parents under a theory of negligent supervision, the trial
court denied the motion, finding that under the doctrine of parental immunity, the
claim was not actionable.
The court noted that the parental immunity doctrine generally prohibits
children from suing their parents but is subject to many exceptions. Suits for
personal injuries in automobile accidents where there is normally liability insurance

79Id. at 210 (citing Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 23 S.E. 582, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1895)).
The plaintiffs argued "the fire was caused by the defendant's placing the bed in the room too close
to the baseboard heater" which started the fire and "the absence of a smoke alarm at least aggravated
their injuries." The defendant's expert testified that the fire was caused by a burning cigarette dropped
by one of the parents. Id. at 208.
8 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
82 1996 WL 731875 (W. Va. Dec. 20, 1996).
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are not barred." Where the injury is from intentional or wilful conduct, the doctrine
is abrogated, but it remains with respect to claims arising from reasonable corporal
punishment.'" Given the many exceptions, the Cole court concluded "[biased upon
equitable principles of fairness, as well as concepts underlying the doctrine of
comparative negligence, we believe that any parental negligence which proximately
causes the death of the parent's child should be considered when determining the
liability of the third party."85 Thus, where the parents seek compensation without
consideration of their culpability proximately causing the death due to negligent
supervision, "it would be inequitable for such parent to collect the total amount of
an award when the parent is found to be at least partially at fault." 6
Instead of imputing the negligence of the parent to the child's estate,
however, the court found that the parent should simply be treated as a joint
tortfeasor. The court instructed:
Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-7-6, the jury and judge "may award
such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and, may direct in
what proportions the damages shall be distributed to" the listed
beneficiaries. By treating any beneficiary separately and
apportioning the damages, the trial court simply may apply our
comparative negligence doctrine to the negligent parent. If a
parent's action proximately caused the death of his or her child
along with other third-party tortfeasors, the parent and other thirdparty tortfeasors may be held jointly and severally liable for the
award. Therefore, we hold, in a wrongful death action, where one
or both of the parents of a deceasedchild arefound negligent in
contributingto the death of such child, either thejudge or the jury
should apportion the damages between the parents and other
beneficiaries, ifany, and assess the relative liability of each
87
torOfeasor in order to comply our comparative negligence rule.

83

Id. at *12 (citing Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 722 (1976)). In West Virginia, family members can

generally sue each other for personal injuries. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va
1978) (abolishing interspousal immunity). For a son versus father suit over an exploding lawnmower,
see Tippie v. Tippie, 466 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1996).
84 Cole, 1996 WL 731875, at *12 (citing Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991)).
85 Id. at *12
86

Id.

"7Id. at *14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Under Cole, each parent's negligence must be considered independently.
The court rejected any concern that either a husband or wife could "collect an entire
wrongful death award for a child when the other spouse partially is at fault for a
child's death."88 In a footnote, the court rejected the argument that "the negligent
parent will undoubtedly share or jointly benefit in the full recovery by the other
spouse, in spite of what may be substantial negligence on his or her part and thus
benefit or profit from his or her own wrong."8 9 The court stated:

However, we find this rationale ignores the fact that parents are
often divorced, as is the situation in the present case. Furthermore,
under our statute and our comparative negligence rule, we find this
concern is diminished because each spouse is getting a separate
award based upon their individual loss. Moreover, we believe it
would be just as inequitable to deny a wrongful death beneficiary
an award based upon the tortious conduct of another beneficiary as
it would be to hold a negligent tortfeasor totally liable without any
right to seek contribution from another negligent tortfeasor. We,
therefore, will permit application of the comparative negligence
rule to a parent whose own negligent act contributed to the death of
his or her child.' °
Under Miller and Cole, therefore, the negligence of the parent or parents of
an unborn child must be considered by the jury. The following scenarios illustrate
the Cole rule.
A pregnant mother is injured in a vehicular accident with a coal truck, and
loses her unborn child. The child's estate sues the coal company which files a third
party complaint against the mother. The jury apportions 40% of the negligence to
the mother and 60% to the coal company and awards $1,000,000 to the estate,
divided equally between the parents. Under Cole, the mother is effectively treated
as ajoint tortfeasor; accordingly, the coal company's liability to the estate would be
$600,000 and the mother's liability would be $400,000. 91

x Id. at*14 n.20.
9 Cole, 1996 WL 731875, at * 14 n.20 (citing Stull v. Ragsdale, 620 S.W.2d 264 (Ark. 1981)).
9 Id.
91The mother is used here for illustrative purposes. The joint tortfeasor could be the father. As to the

negligence of one parent affecting the other, Cole states: "The jury should have been instructed that
the negligence of one of the adults could not be imputed to the other adult." 1996 WL 731875 (citing
Walton v. Given, 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (W. Va. 1975)).
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This is where Cole gets confusing. Chapter 55, article 7, section 6(c)(2) of
the West Virginia Code requires the jury to set forth separately the amount of
damages awarded for reasonable funeral, hospital, medical and other expenses and
requires the personal representative to expend any amount recovered for those
expenses. As to the other damages, the statute requires the jury to award damages
not to the estate, but to the statutory beneficiaries. This section states the jury, or the
court in a bench trial:
may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and, may
direct in what proportion the damages shall be distributed to the.
. brothers, sisters, parents... if there are no such survivors, then
the damages shall be distributed in accordance with the decedent's
will, or, if there is no will, in accordance with the laws of descent
and distribution."92
In prior decisions, the court recognized that while wrongful death actions are
brought on behalf of the estate, "the personal representative is merely a nominal
party, and any recovery passes directly to the beneficiaries designated in the
wrongful death statute and not to the decedent's estate."'93
Typically, in a scenario involving joint and several liability, the plaintiff
recovers the full award of damages less the percentage of fault attributed to her.94
Applying Cole, the wife's recovery should be reduced by her comparative
negligence of 40%. It is unclear from Cole as to exactly how to achieve this. If
each parent was awarded $500,000, the total award would be $1,000,000. If the
mother's award is reduced by $200,000 ($500,000 - (40% x $500,000)), there would
be a total payment of $800,000, with $500,000 to the father and $300,000 to the
mother. 9

)2 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(2) (1994).

" Richardson v. Kennedy, 475 S.E.2d 418, 424 (W. Va. 1996) (citing McClure v. McClure, 403
S.E.2d 197 (W. Va.1991)). See also, Dunsmore v. Hartman, 84 S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (W. Va. 1954);
Peters v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 191 S.E. 581, 583 (W. Va. 1937).
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
An obvious problem here is who pays who. The illustration of a third party complaint is used
because of the fact pattern in Cole. Unless specifically excluded by policy language, the mother's
insurance carrier could end up paying part of the verdict to the mother. See Sitzes v. Anchor Motor
Freight, 289 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1991). Assuming plenty of coverage for the mother and the coal
company, the damages would be paid as follows. First, the damages to the parents are shared pro rata,
i.e., Coal Company 60%, mother/carrier 40%. The coal company would pay the father $300,000 and
the mother $180,000. The mother's carrier would pay the father the remaining $200,000 and $120,000
"
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Cole could be circumvented by the court or jury awarding damages in
amounts that avoid the percentage of negligence assessed against the mother. For
example, using the same scenario, instead of splitting the $1,000,000 award equally,
the court or jury could award $800,000 to the father and $200,000 to the mother.
The mother's $200,000 award would be reduced by 40%, or $80,000, leaving her
a net award of $120,000. The non-negligent father would get a full award of
$800,000, making the total payment to the beneficiaries of the estate $920,000. By
manipulating the amounts given to the beneficiaries, the court or jury could totally
avoid the application of comparative fault.
The end result is a reduction in the total amount of money paid for the
wrongful death of the fetus, although the negligence of the parent would not be
imputed to the estate. An easier way to resolve this issue, in cases involving an
unborn fetus, would be to recognize the unique nature of the situation and hold that
the negligence of the parent reduces by the total award to the estate. A net figure,
taking into account the reduction, could be distributed by the court or jury to the
beneficiaries. This is more in keeping with the theory of comparative negligence,
which is to hold each party responsible for fault, and eliminates the confusing
situation which results from Cole.
If the mother is killed, as in Farley,the problem with Cole is striking. Since
the mother would not be a statutory beneficiary since she did not survive,
application of her percentage of fault is meaningless, since the jury will only give
awards to the survivors. Thus, in an accident where there is 90% of fault by the
mother, and 10% by the coal company, the award to the father would not be reduced
at all. Assuming a claim against the mother's estate, there would be payment
although there is not much doubt that the coal company could pay more than its
share.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia dealt with a related issue
in Belcher v. Goins, where it recognized a cause of action for the loss or impairment
of parental consortium for a child. 96 Since the loss of consortium claim is a
derivative claim based entirely upon the same injury to the parent, the court held that
any percentage of negligence attributable to the parent reduced the amount of the
child's recovery. While a wrongful death claim is a direct action by the estate of the
unbom child, the damages payable to the parents are derivative of the estate's claim.
It is not unfair, then, to impute the negligence of the parents to the child's estate to
reduce the total award. This solves the problem recognized and rejected in Cole.
Given the unique nature of a wrongful death claim for an unborn child, the court
should not follow Cole to its illogical end.

to the mother, assuming the policy did not expressly exclude such payment. If there was a problem,
the mother's insurance could pay the father, with the coal company paying the rest of the father's plus
the mother's award. This complex insurance issue is left to another, smarter author. If the mother was
without insurance and judgment proof, the coal company might pay the whole verdict under joint and

several liability. Even if no third party complaint was filed, the mother's recovery would be reduced
by her percentage of fault under Cole. See Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981).
')6Ann

P'M5M(W V

i Qrn)

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/6

20

Hurney: A Practical View of Farley v. Sartin
PRACTICAL VIEW OF FARLEY V. SARTIN

1996]
C.

Damages

The West Virginia Wrongful Death Act sets forth the various elements of
damages which can be awarded in a wrongful death action. In a case involving the
death of an unborn child, damages for the care, treatment and hospitalization
incident to the injury resulting in death, and reasonable funeral expenses will
probably not be significant, nor in much dispute. Damages for "services, protection,
care and assistance provided by the decedent" would not appear to apply in a case
for the death of an unborn child. 97 The primary focus in Farley cases will be the
damages for lost income and "sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may
include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the
decedent." 98
D.

Loss ofSociety

The emotional loss to parents is the subject of the damages allowed for
." The loss of a child presents a powerful
emotional argument which can result in enormous damage awards. For example,
in Roberts v. Stevens Clinic,99 a McDowell County jury awarded $10,000,000 to the
parents and two siblings of a two and one-half year old child. The court reduced the
verdict, stating "[i]n a nutshell, the reason that we are compelled to reduce the
verdict from $10,000,000 to $3,000,000 is that plaintiffs counsel implied, in his
closing argument, that the duty of the jury was to place a value on Michael's life.""1cn
While "the majority ofjurisdictions permit parental recovery for the loss of
their child's society in a wrongful death action.., there is much less agreement.
• in cases involving the loss of a fetus.'' In Wrongful Death and the Loss of
Society of the Unborn, the author notes that courts addressing this issue take three
general approaches.0 2 The first approach is to treat a viable unborn child the same
as an independently existing child.0 3 Where the loss of society for an independently
existing child is recoverable, it too is recoverable for the unborn child; where no

"sorrow, mental anguish, and solace ...

17

See Martin v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1993) (involving case where decedent worked odd

jobs to assist his mother with household expenses and purchased gifts and necessaries for his
daughter).
98W. VA. CODE §

55-7-6(c)(1)(A).

345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
'oId.
at 798.
o Meadows, supra note 8, at 108.
102 Id.

103 1,4.t IARnO
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recovery is allowed, the converse would be true.1°4 Other courts, such as Didonato
v. Workman, °5 find that any award for loss of society would be based purely on
speculation rather than reason." The final approach focuses on actual evidence of
loss of society. 7
Given the heavy reliance by the Farley court on the remedial nature of West
Virginia's Wrongful Death Act, it is unlikely that the court would adopt any
approach denying as speculative damages for the loss of society for an unborn child.
Similar to courts which treat the unborn child the same as an independently existing
child, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will most likely allow
recovery. This is consistent with the court's recognition in Flannery v. United
States that a plaintiff rendered semi-comatose and unable to sense his injuries can
recover for the loss of enjoyment of life." 8 The loss of enjoyment of life "is a
separate compensable element in a damage award and clearly not part of pain and
suffering. 9 Indeed, the Flannerycourt used an infant blinded by excessive oxygen
as an example, stating that the infant had a loss even though its ability to
comprehend was minimal. Roberts v. Stevens Clinic offers some insight as to what
may be argued by the plaintiff regarding the loss of society, specifically prohibiting
asking the jury to place a value on the life of the unborn child.
As to this item of damages, however, evidence of the parents' attitude
toward the pregnancy should be admissible. In Voelker v. Frederick Business
PropertiesCo., the court held:
[E]vidence of a beneficiary's relationship with the decedent may be
admitted into evidence for purposes of determining damages in a
wrongful death action pursuant to W. Va. Code, 55-7-6(c)(1 )[1 989]
which provides for the recovery of damages for "[s]orrow, mental
anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship,
comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent[.]"
Whether evidence is relevant pursuant to W. Va. R. Evid. 401 and
402 when determining damages in a wrongful death action and
whether the probative value of such evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to W. Va. R.
Evid. 403 must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Moreover,
on appeal this Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on the

,o Id. at 109 & n.82 (citing various cases).
o 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
'0 Meadows, supra note 8, at 109.
107 Id. at

110-11.

"' Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982).
'"

Douglas L. Price, Hedonic Damages,95 W. VA. L. REv. 1055, 1060 (1993).
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admissibility of such evidence unless there has been an abuse of
discretion."'
Similarly, in Walker v. Walker,"' the court held that the trial court cold
consider many factors in distributing a wrongful death settlement, including "the
relationship between the decedent and his children.',".
Relevant evidence, for example, could include the circumstances of the
pregnancy and the parents' attitudes toward the pregnancy (such as considering
abortion at the time of the death; the mother using drugs, alcohol or tobacco despite
the risk to the unborn child; or abusive behavior by the father toward the pregnant
mother). Instructive in this regard are Arnold v. Turek,"' and White v. Gosiene! 4
Interpreting the 1989 amendments to Chapter 55, article 7, section 6 of the West
Virginia Code in Arnold, the court found that they "removed the right of the jury or
[judge] to distribute damages in such amounts.., as [found] fair, just and equitable.
Instead, the net proceeds.., must [be distributed] in accordance with.., the laws
of descent and distribution.""' 5 The 1989 amendments removed the discretionary
division of damages by the court or jury, causing the result in White, where an
itinerant father shared in an award." 6 Under the 1989 amendments "the fact that the
wrongful death victim has been abandoned by a parent does not foreclose that parent
from sharing in a wrongful death award thereunder." This was fixed in 1992, as
recognized in White, to restore discretion in the distribution of damages." 7 Now,
it is once again the province of the jury to make an award and divide it among the
beneficiaries. As demonstrated by Roberts v. Stevens Clinic, the loss of a child is
a powerful emotional argument. It may very well be that in a given case, counsel
for the defendant does not choose to attack the loss of consortium claim for fear of
angering the jury. Nonetheless, whether to use the evidence at trial as a tactical
decision is not determinative of whether it should be relevant and admissible.
E.

Loss of Income
In wrongful death actions, Chapter 55, article 7, section 6(c)(2)(B)(i) of the

10

Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co., 465 S.E.2d 246, 252 (W. Va. 1995)
350 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1986).

112Id.,

Syl.

"1 407 S.E.2d 706 (W. Va. 1991).
"4

420 S.E.2d 567 (W. Va. 1992).

"I Arnold,407 S.E.2d at 711.
116 White,

420 S.E.2d at 571.

117 fd st S,7/)
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West Virginia Code allows as an element of damages compensation for reasonably
expected loss of income of the decedent." 8 This language does not require a
deduction for estimated personal living expenses." 9 To determine the future lost
earnings in a wrongful death case, "[t]he jury may determine the probable earnings
of the deceased in a wrongful death action by considering his age, earning capacity,
experience and habits, during his probable lifetime."' 2 As a predicate for an award
for loss of economic benefit from a decedent, a plaintiff must first produce evidence
from which the jury can rationalize and determine with reasonable accuracy the
probable quantum of the loss.' Any award
for pecuniary loss in a wrongful death
2
action must be reduced to present value.
The issue of whether there is recovery for future lost income of an unborn
child under the wrongful death action seems to be speculative at best. A claim for
future lost wages should be based upon some evidentiary prerequisite, such as age,
education and training and prior history of earnings.
None of these exists in a
23
situation where the deceased is an unborn child.
In another context, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
recognized inherent uncertainty of how a child might turn out. In James G. v.
Caserta, the court allowed a suit against a physician for a failed sterilization
resulting in pregnancy.' 4 The court, however, refused to allow the parents to
recover as damages the ordinary costs of raising a child they would not otherwise
have had, stating that "the main problem with awarding damages for ordinary childrearing expenses is in attempting to project the future emotional and other benefits
that might be derived from having a healthy child ...[a]s a consequence, it declined
to award the costs of child-rearing expenses because the damages were too
speculative."'" Indeed, in a footnote, the court stated:
Perhaps the cost of rearing and educating the child could be
determined through use of actuarial tables or similar economic

18

Wehnerv. Weinstein, 444 S.E.2d 27,38 (W. Va. 1994).

119 Id.

"2Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981); see also Craighead v. N. & W. Ry., 475 S.E.2d
363, 372 (W. Va. 1996).
2

Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D.W. Va. 1969).

2

Adkins v. Foster, 421 S.E.2d 271, 275 (W. Va. 1992); see Aldridge v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co.,

789 F.2d 1061, 1068 (4th Cir. 1986) (Boyle, J.,
concurring); Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal
Corp., 326 S.E.2d 427,431 (W. Va. 1984).
123 See

BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 39.

"4

332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.1985).

23

Id. at 878 (quoting McKemin v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984)).
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information. But whether these costs are outweighed by the
emotional benefits which will be conferred by that child cannot be
calculated. The child may turn out to be loving, obedient and
attentive, or hostile, unruly and callous. The child may grow up to
be the president of the United States, or to be an infamous criminal.
life,
In short, it is impossible to tell, at an early stage in the child's
12 6
whether its parents have sustained a net loss or net gain.
Other significant events in the life of any person could change the
beneficiaries of the estate. Once a child marries, the primary beneficiary becomes
the spouse and, if there are any, the children, as opposed to the parents. Thus, at
birth, it is difficult to see how, as a matter of law, the parents could argue that they
expected any income from an unborn child, particularly for its adult
reasonably
27
life.1
In an injury case, Stone v. KaiserAluminum, the court found the plaintiffs
future lost damages was speculative. 8 In Stone, the plaintiff testified that
for
claim
he expected to complete a master's of science degree and, according to the West
Virginia Department of Labor, could expect to obtain employment six months
thereafter. Because "the general rule with regard to proof of damages is that such
proof cannot be sustained by mere speculation or conjecture," the court found
"plaintiff's testimony with respect to his future lost wages was highly
speculative."'2 9 The "plaintiff's testimony that he could expect to find employment
six months following completion of his degree in December of 1995 clearly did not
meet this requirement. The jury's award of future lost wages was, therefore, based
upon mere speculation and conjecture and cannot be sustained."' 30 The court
ordered a remittitur of the amount awarded for future lost wages.
In Craigheadv. N & WRailway,'13 the defendants argued that the award of
future lost earnings, based upon testimony that the decedent would have joined the
United States military or would have earned the wages of an average person, were
32
not "proved to a reasonable degree of certainty" as required byAdkins v. Foster.'
Distinguishing Adkins as a personal injury case, the court stated "the process of
determining the extent to which an individual's future earning capacity is impaired
126 Id.

In James G. v. Caserta,the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recognized that generally,
parents do not have the obligation to provide for children after the age of majority. Id. at 882.
27

128475 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1996).

..
9 Craighead v. N. & W. Ry., 475 S.E.2d 363,456 (W. Va. 1996).
"' Id. (citing Sisler v. Hawkins, 217 S.E.2d 60, Syl. Pt. 5. (1975)).
13' Id.
117
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is quite different from calculating the amount of future earnings that were lost due
to the individual's untimely death." The determination of impairment of earning
capacity requires consideration of the extent and permanency of the injury, the type
of future employment, and the difference between the amount plaintiff would have
earned but for the injury and the amount the plaintiff would be able to earn with the
injury. "With regard to the determination of future lost earnings in wrongful death
cases, this court has simply held that 'the jury may determine the probable earnings
of the deceased in a wrongful death action by considering his age, earning capacity,
experience and habits, during his probable lifetime."" 33 Based upon this standard,
the court concluded "the evidence of decedent's future lost earnings was not unduly
speculative and was properly allowed."'34
In Martin v. Smith, the court affirmed an award of damages for the
deceased for reasonably expected loss of income.' 35 The court stated:
We find that the lower court made no error in assessing damages
for the loss of income suffered by Mrs. Martin and the decedent's
young daughter. In spite of the difficult circumstances of his
upbringing, the decedent worked odd jobs as a student to assist his
mother with household expenses. He also purchased gifts and
necessaries for his daughter from the modest sums he earned at odd
jobs. The decedent was the first in his family to attend college
where he received financial assistance. There is no reason that the
decedent, if properly treated, could not have provided services,
protection, care and assistance to his mother and child.'36
Economists can be hired to present a range of earnings based on statistical
profiles.'3 7 In Reager v. Anderson, the court affirmed an award of $1,250,000 to a
minor patient who lost a leg as a result of medical malpractice. 3 Part of the
plaintiff's evidence included testimony of economic and vocational rehabilitation
experts opining as to a range of lost future earnings from $192,236 to $1,154,942

...Craighead,475 S.E.2d at 373 (citing Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613, Syl. Pt. 4 (W. Va.
1981)).
134 Id.

'

438 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1993).

16

Id. at 323-24.

137

'

See BROOKSHIRE& SMITH, supra note 39.
371 S.E.2d 619 (W- Va- 198'_
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based upon five vocational scenarios." No special interrogatory was submitted to
the jury as to the vocational scenario selected. The court affirmed that the jury's
award, noting "that none of the testimony as to these elements of damages was
disputed by any witness, even though the appellant conducted extensive pretrial
discovery on these matters. The weight of the evidence on these special damages
was for the jury to decide."'"4 Without addressing the issue of whether the damages
were speculative, the court proceeded to compare the verdict in Reager to verdicts
in other jurisdictions, coming to the ultimate conclusion that since there had been
million-dollar verdicts for amputations in other courts, the verdict was not
"monstrous."
The issue in a Farley case is whether there can be any reasonable certainty
in predicting the lost future income of an unborn child. This may be particularly
true where the child is of an age in utero which is medically considered nonviable.
A strong argument can be made that any damages for lost income are speculative,
involving a pure guess as to whether the child would survive to working age;
whether the child would, in fact, work; what type of job, if any, the child would
obtain; and how long the child would live, while participating in the work force.
The pure speculative nature of this type of evidence should make it inadmissible as
a matter of law in Farley cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Farley v. Sartin claims present significant practical problems that must be
resolved in future litigation. Because Farleywas decided on narrow grounds - the
sole issue being whether an unborn child is a "person" under the Wrongful Death
Act - the opinion offers little guidance to practicing lawyers.
Evidence of negligence by the parents is admissible on liability issues, and
reduces the parent's recovery under West Virginia's comparative negligence
scheme. Evidence as to whether the child would have been healthy should be
admissible to counter the plaintiffs claims of causation and damages. Evidence of
the parents' relationship with the unborn child - including the mother's actions
affecting the fetus - is admissible as to causation and damages, particularly as to

"9

Reager, 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988). The five scenarios were:
(1) The patient chooses not to attend college but can hold a job; or (2) the patient chooses
to attend college, graduates and can hold a job; or (3) the patient begins college, cannot
finish due to medical reasons but can hold a non-skilled job; or (4) the patient attends college,
and graduates but cannot hold ajob thereafter due to medical problems; or (5) the patient
chooses not to attend college and for medical reasons cannot hold ajob.

For each scenario, jobs were listed for a person with both legs and without one leg, and an
average income was commuted each way. The differences between average annual income with both
legs and an average annual income without one leg were multiplied by the expected number of
workforce years and were reduced to present value.
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loss of solace, etc. Finally, recovery for lost income of an unborn child should not
be permitted as speculative.
Application of these proposals, all of which are grounded in West Virginia
law, will properly allow consideration of fault by all responsible, and will eliminate
pure speculation as to damages. A Farley claim will focus on reasonable damages
for the emotional loss related to the death of an unborn child.
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